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Introduction
Spanish ambassadors in Amsterdam not only sent reports to Madrid 
concerning the asiento trade between Curaçao and Jamaica, but also ex-
pressed their opinion on how the asiento trade was channelled to Span-
ish America. As early as 1664, Esteban de Gamarra was of the opinion 
that the system of trans-imperial commerce embodied in the asiento, 
which combined the official slave trade with the contraband of goods 
towards Spanish America, made “the Grillos masters of the Indies.”1 
Certainly, Domenico Grillo’s company was able to capture a large slice 
of the trade in African slaves, European merchandise, and Asian goods 
that took place in the English and the Dutch Atlantic. But directing this 
trade to Spanish America was not something that could be done as easily 
as Esteban de Gamarra suggested. The Spanish Atlantic and the Span-
ish American colonies were populated by many different actors with 
vested interests in intra-imperial trade and willing to defend their mar-
kets ferociously against new competitors such as Domenico Grillo and 
his factors.
This chapter scrutinises how Grillo and Lomellino’s company com-
peted against and cooperated with consulados, independent traders, 
local tax-farmers, royal officials, and colonial buyers to operate the 
 intra-imperial branch of the asiento trade in Spanish America. While a 
focus on jurisdictional conflicts will allow us to illuminate who, how, 
and why certain actors opposed to the asiento trade and its factors, a 
deep analysis of the local contexts will shed light on how those other lo-
cales were indispensable to the functioning of the asiento trade in Span-
ish America.
Setting up the asiento on the ground involved exercising new monopo-
listic rights, tax exemptions, and jurisdictional powers. Therefore, it in-
volved appropriating the African slave trade that had been taking place 
both officially and clandestinely in the Spanish Caribbean and untie the 
networks that local groups had woven around it. The conflicts caused 
by Grillo and Lomellino’s asiento heralded future clashes between local 
merchants and the many asiento and chartered companies that were to 
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emerge in the Spanish Atlantic during the late 17th century and through-
out the 18th century, such as the Compañía de Comercio de Barcelona 
or the Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas.2
In addition to enforcing the privileges of the asiento, Grillo and Lo-
mellino’s firm tried very hard to trespass on the commercial privileges of 
other actors. Trading beyond the charter was a way to increase business. 
The two most direct ways to achieve this were: to diversify transactions, 
importing goods other than African slaves into Spanish America and 
entering the inter-American trade circuits; second, taking the slave trade 
outside the geographical boundaries imposed by the asiento charter. 
That merchants dealing with African slaves had more diversified busi-
nesses portfolios is widely known. While Fredrick Bowser was of the 
opinion that contraband in goods other than slaves played a key role in 
the business of Portuguese slave merchants in the first half of the 17th 
century, Enriqueta Vila Vilar argues that side-trades did not become 
relevant for slave traders until the mid-century.3 There is little doubt that 
when in 1713 the Crown authorised the English South Sea Company to 
send one good-laden ship a year to Spanish America, this was nothing 
but formalising the contraband activities in which all asiento companies 
participated actively in the second half of the 17th century.4 It is not my 
aim to assess how profitable these side-trades were for Grillo and Lo-
mellino, but to illuminate the different dynamics of conflict in which the 
asiento trade was involved from a jurisdictional perspective.
While previous chapters analysed the asiento charter as an instrument 
to allow the Crown and metropolitan merchants like Domenico Grillo 
to capture profits generated by the colonies, this chapter will show how 
various local agents – traders, royal officials and buyers – also benefit-
ted in different ways, and to different extents, from the asiento trade. 
In order to operate the asiento, Domenico Grillo mobilised resources 
throughout the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, including professional 
merchants, relatives and friends, ships and skippers, and lines of credit. 
However, none of those efforts could meet with success without the co-
operation of local agents in Spanish America.
Among the different port cities covered in the vast Spanish American ge-
ography of the asiento trade, the Isthmus of Panama serves as an excellent 
point of observation to tackle jurisdictional conflicts and to illuminate the 
cooperation between the Spanish American traders and Domenico Gril-
lo’s transnational network of agents. The Isthmus of Panama was a stra-
tegic hinge connecting the transatlantic and Caribbean trades with Pacific 
South America. The interests of many merchants, regardless of their ori-
gin, company size and field of specialisation, and also of local agents that 
tried to control the territory and channel trade, converged on this “artery 
of the empire.”5 It was in this conflictive and disputed region where Do-
menico Grillo focused his company’s efforts to maximise returns.6
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The Isthmus of Panama in Grillo and Lomellino’s 
Strategies
Domenico Grillo and Ambrosio Lomellino privileged the Isthmus of 
Panama as their company’s main trading centre in the Spanish Carib-
bean. In Chapter 4, we saw how they deployed and organised a network 
of agents covering the whole Caribbean. However, since the very be-
ginning, Grillo and Lomellino directed most of the flow of the trans- 
imperial trade in African slaves and global goods towards Portobelo’s 
port. Initially, Grillo and Lomellino’s company was entitled to unload 
slaves in Cartagena de Indias, Portobelo, and Veracruz. Although these 
three ports absorbed 86.2% of the company’s known trade, the distri-
bution of slaves among them was distinctly unequal. Around 11,403 
captives were disembarked in Portobelo, which amounted to 53.7% of 
all the slaves unloaded. In contrast, Cartagena de Indias received only 
22.6% of the trade – 4,811 slaves – and Veracruz a mere 9.9% – 2,100 
slaves. The other 13.7% of the trade was directed to ports that from 
1664 onward qualified to receive fixed quotas of slaves, including Ha-
vana, Santiago de Cuba, San Juan de Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Ca-
racas, Cumaná, and La Guaira.7
The importance of Portobelo in Grillo and Lomellino’s management 
of the asiento trade emerges more clearly when contextualised by the 
way their company made use of other Spanish Caribbean ports. The 
asiento ships made direct and indirect voyages from the Dutch and En-
glish Caribbean to Portobelo. The asiento ships conducted ten expedi-
tions carrying around 4,937 slaves from Curaçao directly to Portobelo 
and another two voyages with 747 slaves from Jamaica to Portobelo. 
Slaves from Curaçao also reached Portobelo on 13 indirect asiento voy-
ages that stopped in Cartagena de Indias, where around one-third of the 
slaves (2,528) were sold before the rest (4,961) were forced to continue 
to the Isthmus of Panama.8 Within Grillo and Lomellino’s asiento struc-
ture, Cartagena de Indias was used more like a stopover for the refresh-
ment of the slaves rather than as a market. What reasons did Grillo and 
Lomellino have to concentrate most of the asiento trade in the Isthmus 
of Panama?
The slave trade had paramount importance for the Panamanian busi-
ness sector. By 1607, the president of the Audiencia of Panama regarded 
the slave trade as the region’s leading commercial activity.9 The Pana-
manian demand for African slaves began with the colonisation of the 
isthmus. The population in the hinterland, composed mostly of free and 
enslaved Black people, had a central role in this colonisation. As “surro-
gate colonizers,” Africans worked as farmers and ranchers, gold miners 
and pearl fishers, or operators of the mule trains supporting the trans-
isthmian trades.10 Large maroon communities also grew on the Isthmus 
of Panama and became central actors in the everyday life of the territory, 
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both defying and negotiating terms of Spanish rule.11 The presence of 
African communities in Panamanian towns and villages was equally im-
portant. While enslaved Africans were employed as domestic servants, 
free Black people acquired prominent roles as notaries, leaders of royal 
militias, or specialised workers. For example, by 1607 in Portobelo 316 
African slaves lived with 450 free people of mostly European descent. 
Panama City hosted about 1,322 inhabitants of European descent, while 
the African population included 3,721 enslaved individuals in addition 
to another 742 free Black people.12 As the decades passed, the number 
inhabitants of African origin in Panama City increased. By 1640, ac-
cording to the Jesuits deployed in the Isthmus, 12,000 people of African 
descent populated the city.13
However, rather than representing a final destination for the African 
captives, the Isthmus of Panama was more a nexus for the slave trade, 
as it connected the transatlantic and the Caribbean routes with Pacific 
South America. Until the mid-18th century, when it was superseded by 
Puerto Rico and Cuba, Peru was one of the largest markets for African 
slaves in Spanish America.14 During the first half of the 17th century, ap-
proximately 1,000–1,500 slaves a year were dispatched from Portobelo 
and from there to Panama City and then on to Peru.15 From Panama 
City’s port, Perico, a myriad of ships and barks departed to provide the 
expanding economy of Pacific South America with African slaves.16 The 
maritime slave trade that originated from Panama City affected the de-
mographics of leading coastal cities like Guayaquil, Trujillo, and Lima, 
to the extent that already by the 1600s African slaves represented ap-
proximately one-third to one-half of their populations.17 According to 
Frederick Bowser, by 1640 around 30,000 people of African descent 
inhabited the Peruvian region, almost two-thirds of whom resided in 
Lima.18
As on the Isthmus of Panama, both free Africans and slaves were key 
for the economy of colonial Peru. They joined the indigenous labour 
force in rural estates, for instance, in the wine-producing valleys of Ica 
and Condor, or for the processing of sugar cane, grain milling in the 
valleys of Trujillo, and stock-breeding. Communication routes between 
villages, cities and harbours were manned by African seamen, pilots and 
mule drivers. In the cities, Africans worked in domestic service and re-
tail, and in the workshops of Lima, the looms of Quito and the dock-
yards of Guayaquil.19
The Panamanian slave market attracted Peruvian buyers, who often 
preferred to acquire slaves on the Isthmus in person rather than rely-
ing on retailers. The notarial records from Lima show that small slave- 
owners bought African slaves from Grillo and Lomellino’s agents in 
Panama City. The Lima-based Juan Benítez Murillo bought from fac-
tors in Panama at least four African slaves, whom he resold in Lima 
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in May 167120; Nicolás Astete de Ulloa, also from Lima, did the same 
with a 24-year-old African captive, whom he sold for 850 pesos.21 Many 
slave-owners in Lima appointed relatives or friends who were setting 
out for the Isthmus of Panama to buy African slaves on their behalf 
from Grillo and Lomellino’s factors. For instance, in 1670 doña Paula 
Antonio Enríquez del Castillo, the wife of the most senior judge in the 
Audiencia of Lima, entrusted General don Juan de Urdanigui with buy-
ing a female African captive in Panama.22 In July of that same year, the 
cleric don Francisco Fernández de Quirós was given 700 pesos from his 
brother in law in Lima to buy a female slave in Panama City, to be deliv-
ered to Lima by a third party.23
However, Grillo and Lomellino’s ambitions were not limited to the 
Isthmus of Panama, and from the start they strived to link the trade in 
African captives with the commercial circuits of Pacific South America. 
From Madrid, in October 1664, Ambrosio Lomellino informed his part-
ners in Genoa that, while slaves were being sold in Panama for 550 or 
600 pesos, in Lima they were expected to fetch at least 850 pesos. Ac-
cordingly, Grillo and Lomellino had ordered 2,000 captives to be taken 
there.24 It seems that, initially, the asiento factors used local middlemen 
to introduce African slaves to Peru. However, after the destruction of 
Panama City by Morgan in 1671, some factors settled in Lima to es-
tablish a branch of Domenico Grillo’s company, which remained active 
until at least 1675.
Merchants operating in and from the Isthmus of Panama engaged in 
the slave trade to varying degrees, but all of them complemented their 
portfolios with other trades.25 Grillo and Lomellino’s agents were no ex-
ception to this practice. For traders, the Isthmus was an excellent place 
to diversify their investments due to the annual (subsequently biannual) 
fair that it hosted. At this fair, held in Nombre de Dios from 1544 to 
1597 and then in Portobelo from 1598 to 1739, Spanish and Peruvian 
merchants met to exchange large sums of goods, merchandise, and sil-
ver.26 According to Alfredo Castillero Calvo, at least 95 fairs were held, 
and the value of the merchandise exchanged may have been in excess of 
2,000 million pesos.27
However, the commercial reach of Portobelo’s fairs during the 17th 
century was limited. In 1645, the president of the Audiencia of Panama 
expressed this in no uncertain terms: “Nobody brings goods [to Por-
tobelo]. Everyone wants to send them to Lima.”28 According to Carlos 
Álvarez Nogal, merchants met at the fair to close ongoing deals and ne-
gotiate the exchange of goods to be delivered elsewhere.29 The seasonal 
nature of the system, the rhythm of which depended on the sailing dates 
of Atlantic and Pacific convoys, brought transactions to a standstill be-
tween fairs. Grillo and Lomellino’s factors filled this gap by using the 
asiento ships to import goods from Curaçao. While the asiento was in 
operation, there were fairs at Portobelo in 1663, 1665, 1667, 1670, and 
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1673, but the asiento ships continued arriving every year to the Carib-
bean coasts of the Isthmus of Panama.30
The volume of trade being carried along the Portobelo-Lima route 
was much greater than the fair records suggest. Owing to the likely in-
cidence of fraud – and the difficulties in quantifying it – the accounts of 
Peruvian merchants offer a glimpse of the importance of this commer-
cial route. For instance, in 1664 Diego Dávila and Francisco Basurto 
Velosillo raised 160,000 pesos in Lima to purchase some merchandise 
on the Isthmus of Panama. Once in Panama City, Francisco Basurto 
also bought some African slaves from the asiento factors on credit. His 
reputation sufficed for the factors to sell him 26 women and a man for 
8,580 pesos, to be paid in Lima eight months down the line.31 On their 
return to Lima, Dávila and Basurto sold the slaves and the rest of the 
merchandise they had acquired on the isthmus for 342,000 pesos. Cer-
tainly, to this sound operation, we should discount the cost of capital 
invested as well as other costs, like freight, insurance, or the captives’ 
maintenance. However, it is worth noting that a single company oper-
ating on the Panama-Lima route was able to sell merchandise and Af-
rican slaves for more money than the Crown was paid in exchange for 
the slave asiento (300,000 pesos) – and this is assuming that Grillo and 
Lomellino met their obligations with the Crown, which could hardly be 
taken for granted.32 In view of the buoyant trade circulating down the 
Panama-Lima axis, it is easy to understand Grillo and Lomellino’s inter-
est in the Isthmus of Panama.
On the Panama-Lima axis, Grillo and Lomellino’s factors and the local 
merchants exchanged African slaves, Asian spices and European manufac-
tures for Peruvian silver, colonial goods like clothing, wine, flour, sugar, 
indigo, or cocoa. His deals in the Isthmus of Panama earned Giustiniano 
Giustiniani at least 352,313 pesos in 1664.33 In addition to bagging some 
silver, that same year Giustiniani exchanged a batch of 27 African slaves 
for 1,400 botijas (bottles) of pisco wine and 1,843 varas (1,540.7 metres) 
of blue and black cloth “from the valleys,” that is, from the hinterland of 
Trujillo.34 At the time of the embargo of the company branch in Panama 
City in 1667, royal officials found 102,165 pesos, but the amounts that 
Grillo and Lomellino’s factors dealt with were in fact much larger.35 In 
July 1673, the agents of the Lima consulado in Panama estimated that, 
between June 1671 and September 1672, the factors of the asiento had 
moved 722,399 pesos in ingots and coin between Panama City and Por-
tobelo. As these agents pointed out, due to Henry Morgan’s attack on 
Panama City, this was a bad year for business, so the volume of trade in a 
normal year would have been far greater for the asiento factors.36
On the Isthmus of Panama, the factors did not limit themselves to 
shipping silver and other colonial products to Europe, but they also rein-
vested a significant proportion of trade returns in the local markets and 
regional commercial circuits. In 1667, Giustiniano Giustiniani bought 
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3,000 loads of cocoa from a Peruvian supplier in Panama City, which he 
later sold to other Spanish merchants in the Portobelo fair. The payment 
was also in silver, but mostly consisted in European clothing. Giustini-
ani sold these clothes to a Panamanian merchant for 53,000 or 54,000 
pesos. Without accounting for transport costs, the transaction yielded 
returns of 43,000/44,000 pesos.37
The factors’ interest in colonial goods and merchandise was not con-
tingent but structural. When in 1672 Agostino Grillo moved to Lima, 
he quickly shipped 1,500 sacks of flour, 1,179 barrels of wine and fine 
clothes and hats to the Isthmus of Panama, where they were exchanged, 
sold or shipped somewhere else.38 For example, the factors operating in 
Portobelo used to send cocoa from Guayaquil to Mexico, where it was 
exchanged for blackwood.39 In a similar fashion, the factors in Veracruz 
bought local products which they brought to Havana in order to pur-
chase hides, indigo and cochineal.40 All these examples bear witness to 
the factors’ diversified trades and their efficiency in penetrating commer-
cial circuits of different scope. However, a central aspect remains open: 
how did Grillo and Lomellino’s factors, who were alien to the contexts 
in which they operated, secure and control all these transactions? An 
enquiry into their day-to-day activities on the Isthmus of Panama will 
provide some answers to this question.
Implementing the Asiento: The Opposition of Slave 
Traders, Royal Officials, and Tax-Farmers
One of the first challenges that Grillo and Lomellino’s factors had to 
confront in the Caribbean was to enforce the asiento privileges and thus 
take control of the promising trade in African slaves that had crystal-
lised in the preceding decade. The revival of the slave trade in the Span-
ish Caribbean during the 1650s brought an increase in the number of 
ships that transported African slaves to Portobelo. Slave ships, mostly 
of Dutch origin, began arriving regularly along Portobelo’s coast from 
late 1657 onward. From then until 1662, a minimum of 12 slave ships 
offloaded 1,221 African captives in Portobelo. Another five slave ships 
were officially barred from mooring and unloading their cargoes there, 
although they probably did so elsewhere on the Isthmus. Although inter-
national merchants conducted most of the slave voyages to the Isthmus 
of Panama, Spanish American merchants also participated in the slave 
trade. The Panamanian authorities seized the slaves and the merchan-
dise brought by three Spanish American ship captains who contended 
that they had sailed from Africa to Portobelo’s coast.41 To summarise, as 
African slaves were once again being offloaded in Portobelo during the 
1650s, the Panamanian slaving economy was likewise revived. Panama-
nian middlemen, royal officials, and traders benefitted in different ways 
from the renewed dynamism of the transisthmian African slave trade.
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Local ship captains and merchants tried to bypass the asiento mo-
nopoly and continued bringing slaves to the Isthmus of Panama after 
the arrival of Grillo and Lomellino’s factors. In 1664, don Diego de 
Gamarra unsuccessfully tried to smuggle between 80 and 120 slaves 
in the ship Nuestra Señora de la Soledad.42 The factors also frustrated 
the  Panama-based Gaspar Alfonso’s attempt aboard his ship Nuestra 
Señora del Rosario y San Vicente.43 Gaspar Alfonso held a grudge 
against Grillo’s factors for years. In February 1672, he had the oppor-
tunity to testify as a witness in proceedings initiated by the consulado 
in Lima to investigate the presence of Agostino Grillo and other factors 
in Lima to sell slaves. Gaspar Alfonso was by then about 60 years old. 
He stated that, for 20 years, he had trafficked slaves between Cartagena 
de Indias, the Isthmus of Panama and Lima. Gaspar Alfonso declared 
that the arrival of Grillo and Lomellino’s factors had undermined the 
interests of local communities of slave traders that had flourished in the 
1650s.44 Like Gaspar Alfonso in Panama, the merchants of Cartagena 
de Indias also retaliated and developed their own illicit commerce by 
establishing reliable trans-imperial relationships with Caribbean slave 
traders. For instance, a sloop that had departed from Jamaica brought 
69 slaves to Cartagena de Indias in May 1672, where the captives had a 
recipient waiting for them, a certain Pedro Barbanzo.45
City governors and royal officials also resisted the asiento privileges. 
From Madrid, Domenico Grillo tried to support his agents by endless 
requests to the Council of the Indies, trying to force the colonial author-
ities to cooperate with the factors.46 The resistance posed by royal offi-
cials and governors should not come as a surprise. As seen in Chapter 3, 
these actors had been among the greatest beneficiaries of the increase of 
trans-imperial intra-American slave trading during the 1650s, as well as 
from encouraging contraband. As soon as Grillo and Lomellino’s agents 
reached Panama City, harsh disputes erupted between them and the 
royal officials over the profit from seized illegal slave cargoes. Shortly af-
ter his arrival on the Isthmus of Panama on 22 March 1663, Giustiniano 
Giustiniani clashed with the royal officials and the governor of the Au-
diencia, Fernando de la Riva Agüero, over the seizure of 122 slaves who 
had arrived illegally two days earlier aboard the ship Nuestra Señora 
de la Soledad.47 Earlier, in January 1663, Giuseppe Bustanzo had also 
disputed the royal officials in Cartagena de Indias the seizing of the ship 
Santo Rey Fernando and the 77,442 pesos that had resulted from the 
sale of its cargo, which included both African slaves and other goods.48
Local tax-farmers also offered great resistance to the asiento. As soon 
as Giustiniano Giustiniani, Marcelo García de las Cañas and Agostino 
Grillo disembarked on the Isthmus of Panama, they tried to enforce the 
asiento fiscal privileges that exempted them from paying the alcabala – 
sales tax – and the sisa – excise tax – among other duties. These privi-
leges were a heavy blow for oligarchs and merchants who controlled the 
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tax-farming business as a means of wielding power locally.49 In Panama 
City, the collection of the alcabala and the sisa was controlled by a con-
sortium of merchants and officials that included leading characters like 
don Diego de Carcelén and Captain Alonso Rodríguez Búcaro.50 The 
profile of alcabala collectors in other asiento harbours, such as Veracruz, 
was not very different. In this city, the main tax-farmers occupied top 
positions in the local government, like Alonso de Andrada, provincial of 
the Santa Hermandad and mayor, and Simón de Galdesada, teniente de 
alférez mayor in Veracruz.51
The jueces conservadores played a key role, mediating between 
tax-farmers, on the one hand, and Grillo and Lomellino’s factors, on the 
other. The asiento juez conservador in Panama ruled in favour of Grillo 
and Lomellino’s factors, but the beneficiaries of the sisa and alcabalas 
appealed to the Council of the Indies in Madrid, and later to the Council 
of Finances. The Panamanians demanded the fees payable to the Crown 
in exchange for the right to collect taxes being downgraded, since the 
slave trade could no longer be taxed. The tax-farmers from Veracruz 
also joined these complaints. In January 1662 they had agreed to pay 
21,000 pesos annually for six years for “the collection of alcabala for 
all goods and merchandise sold in said harbour.”52 Although the tax- 
farmers’ arguments were not entirely baseless, the losses that the asiento 
tax exemptions would cause them were exaggerated. Ultimately, their 
bids for tax-farming rights had been made prior to the asiento, and thus 
before the official slave trade was a regular activity. As such, the official 
slave trade prior to the asiento on the Isthmus of Panama and Veracruz 
had been negligible, as the tax-farmers themselves used to claim.53
The displeasure of the local Panamanian oligarchy after the arrival 
of Guistiniano Giustiniani, Marcelo García de las Cañas, and Agostino 
Grillo is illustrated by the complaint issued in February 1664 by one 
of the councillors of the city government, Amaro López de la Peña y 
Losada. In a memorandum addressed to Philip IV, he enquired whether 
it would not be “better for this profit in the Indies to go to Spaniards 
instead of foreigners, who are taking the fruit of the labour of [Spanish] 
vassals who are not benefitting as much as these aliens.”54 Other actors, 
whose influence upon the Council of the Indies and the Viceroy of Peru 
was much greater, made similar complaints, and even accused Grillo and 
Lomellino’s factors of collaborating with the English attacks on Porto-
belo (1668) and Panama City (1671). These other voices came from the 
mighty consulados of Seville and Lima, which sided with the Panama-
nians and their grievances against the presence of the asiento traders.
Trading Beyond the Charter
The conflicts between the consulados of Seville and Lima and Grillo and 
Lomellino’s organisation reveal another dynamic of friction related to 
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the asiento trade. Conflicts between the asiento factors and tax farmers, 
royal officials, and local slave traders showcase the tensions emerging 
from the overlapping of jurisdictions and exclusive privileges. The con-
flicts that I shall examine in this section were completely different; they 
can be understood as inter-jurisdictional in nature and as the struggle of 
merchants trying to extend their own privileges at the expense of others. 
From Madrid, Domenico Grillo encouraged his factors to work outside 
the limits of the privileges granted by the asiento charter. In a period in 
which the political economy of trade was framed as a one specifically of 
trade privileges, Domenico Grillo’s policies were oriented to undermine 
the exclusive rights of other agents operating in the Spanish Atlantic and 
Pacific South America. His factors on the Isthmus of Panama went as 
far as to challenge the prerogatives of the powerful consulados of Seville 
and Lima.
Although the Sevilla and Lima consulados represented the interests 
of two different groups of merchants, their position concerning Grillo 
and Lomellino’s monopoly was similar, insofar as none of them initially 
opposed it. During the 1662 negotiations between Grillo and Lomellino 
and the Junta de Negros, the consulado of Seville did not object, being 
of the opinion that the asiento would provide new ships for the navy 
and would help the colonial economy by supplying forced labour.55 The 
consulado saw the slave trade as an economic activity that did not in-
terfere with its own – i.e. the Carrera de Indias trade. As pointed out 
by the consulado’s representatives on several occasions “whether negros 
are brought to the Indies or otherwise, this affects the consulado in no 
way, as this is not a merchandise that can be conveyed by fleet or gal-
leon.”56 Perhaps for this reason, the consulado did not oppose Grillo 
and Lomellino’s asiento head on, as it did with various plans to create 
chartered companies to trade with other merchandise throughout the 
17th century.57
The fact that none of the consulados blocked Grillo and Lomellino’s 
monopoly does not mean they were not reluctant about it, however. Con-
sulados’ representatives protested that the manner in which Grillo and 
Lomellino managed the slave asiento harmed the empire in several ways. 
For instance, by 1665 the Seville consulado was complaining about the 
Crown’s decision to turn the slave trade into a monopoly in 1662, and 
recommended going back to the licencing system in operation in the 
period 1595–1640, allowing more merchants to take part. According 
to the consulados, Grillo and Lomellino’s monopoly was also harming 
purchasers, because the African slaves supplied by the company proved 
unsatisfactory and they had intentionally cut supplies to push the prices 
up. The contraband in goods other than slaves practised by Grillo and 
Lomellino’s agents in Spanish America also undermined the interests of 
the Crown, as this commerce went untaxed. Similar arguments applied 
to the silver and gold that the Genoese got in Spanish America, which 
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was shipped to Europe bypassing the Crown’s mints. Naturally, the links 
between Grillo and Lomellino’s factors and the “heretic” slave traders 
in Curaçao and Jamaica were also denounced. It was even claimed that 
the factors of the asiento in Panama had been instrumental in Morgan’s 
destruction of Panama City.58
However, these allegations, which ostensibly defended the interest 
of the empire and the Crown, were in reality aimed at defending the 
corporate interests of the members of the consulados, whose privileges 
were being undermined by Grillo and Lomellino’s factors. The consula-
dos’ description of Grillo and Lomellino’s fraud and smuggling activities 
were perfectly applicable to their own systematic practices of tax evasion 
and contraband.59
The Seville consulado’s aim was to stress the damage that smuggling 
practised unchecked by the asiento ships was causing to its own busi-
ness model. As explained in Chapter 4, the asiento ships were free both 
to sail across the Atlantic and to ply the Caribbean. The Seville con-
sulado, in contrast, used the regular fleets and galleons to organise its 
own trade. The fleets sailed across the Atlantic once or twice a year in 
order to sell European goods in the Caribbean, at the Portobelo fairs, 
and in Veracruz. The reasons to continue with this commercial model 
were multiple, from seeking safety in numbers to minimising commer-
cial risk. Another important reason was to keep European imports un-
der a certain threshold in order to push prices up and increase profit for 
metropolitan merchants. According to the consulado, with Grillo and 
Lomellino bringing imports to the Caribbean throughout the year, by 
the time the fleets arrived there was no demand for their products, or 
prices were low. For this reason, the consulado tried to delay the depar-
ture of Caribbean-bound asiento ships from Cadiz, especially before the 
Carrera de Indias fleet was about to set sail.60
The Seville consulado always opposed merchants who did not be-
long to this organisation sailing freely. Obviously, the consulado always 
viewed slave traders as a threat. For instance, in 1611 it had repeatedly 
asked the Council of the Indies to prevent the free navigation of slave 
ships and instead force them to call at Seville after picking the slaves 
up in Africa and before sailing across the Atlantic.61 The consulado ad-
opted a similar position vis-à-vis the negotiations between Grillo and 
Lomellino and the Junta de Negros in 1662, when it insisted that the 
asiento ships should set sail from Cadiz or Sanlúcar de Barrameda, and 
that they return from the Caribbean alongside the Carrera de Indias 
fleet.62 In March 1665, Philip IV cancelled all existing licences to sail 
outside the Carrera de Indias: permits for navíos sueltos, fleet regazos 
and navíos de registro were thus banned. On hearing the news, the Se-
ville consulado hastened to write a letter to express its wholehearted 
support for the measure, not without criticising the fact that it did not 
extend to Grillo and Lomellino’s asiento.63
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According to the Seville consulado, Domenico Grillo’s company was 
flooding the Caribbean in goods, and this could lead to a drop of prices 
of as much as 50% in under half a year in some markets, such as Santa 
Fe, Colombia. In the consulado’s opinion, the trade being mobilised by 
the asiento factors would cause prices in Spain and the Caribbean to 
converge, and it was likely that in the end “clothing will be as cheap 
[there] as it is in Spain.” Based on the consulado’s data, a vara (0.836 me-
tres) of Bretaña (French fine linen) had dropped from 10 reales to 6, the 
vara of Ruán de Florete (printed cotton or linen cloth from France) from 
12 reales to 7.5, a pound of pepper from 10 reales to 4–5 and even 2.5, 
and the pound of silk from Calabria to 15–16 reales to 8–9, all in under 
five months.64 Could Grillo and Lomellino’s smuggling operations have 
such a drastic effect on the supply and demand of European merchandise 
in the Caribbean?
In April 1669, the prosecutor of the Council of the Indies presented the 
latest accusations against the asiento factors’ smuggling operations as 
“unlikely conjectures” on the part of the Seville consulado.65 Although 
the information used by the consulado was often based on meticulous 
judicial and official investigations, the consulado’s rhetoric and the way 
its demands were framed are a good illustration of the amount of pres-
sure that this corporation put on the government to defend its privileges 
against Domenico Grillo’s company’s encroachment. This pressure took 
different forms. For instance, on 13 November 1665, as many as 25 
major members of the consulado signed a letter addressed to the Coun-
cil of the Indies to block the departure of an asiento ship from Cadiz 
to the Caribbean.66 Often, the consulado’s aggressive rhetoric exceeded 
the limits of what was considered acceptable in the political culture of 
the Spanish Empire. In fact, the prosecutors of the Council advised the 
consulado to use “more modesty . . . and to remember the respect and 
decency that the Council deserved.”67
What, on the other hand, were the interests of the Lima consulado vis-
à-vis the asiento factors? The earliest tension between Grillo and Lomel-
lino’s factors and the Lima consulado’s agents on the Isthmus of Panama 
had to do with the former’s refusal to pay the taxes that were the latter’s 
prerogative to collect at the pass of Boquerón, between Portobelo and 
Panama City. Like Grillo and Lomellino and the Seville consulado, the 
Lima consulado had taken advantage of the Crown’s weak position in the 
late 1650s and early 1660s, and had negotiated substantial tax-farming 
asientos in Pacific South America, political power and commercial priv-
ileges. During the first half of the century, the Lima consulado already 
achieved a prominent position in terms of tax-farming, but during this 
latter half “the consulado merchants became the main source of royal 
revenue in America.” According to Margarita Suárez, the Lima consul-
ado filled the Crown’s coffers with approximately 6 million pesos during 
this period, that is, 21 times more than in the first half of the century.68
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Among the many taxes and duties collected by the Lima consulado, 
the officials deployed at Boquerón requested from Marcelo García de las 
Cañas payment for the avería del mar del norte and the avería del mar 
del sur. Between 1662 and 1664, the Lima consulado had negotiated 
two asientos which included the management of these taxes for 350,000 
and 102,500 pesos, respectively.69 The asiento factors refused, invoking 
the tax exemption granted by their charter. The consulado officials were 
at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Grillo and Lomellino’s agents, owing to the 
jurisdictional strength of the slave asiento and the operation of its jueces 
conservadores. These concerns led them to apply to the king for an ex-
clusive jurisdiction of their own with which to square up to the factors, 
but this was not granted.70 This conflict was similar to those involving 
the alcabalas and sisas in Panama City and Veracruz, although in this 
case the Lima consulado found the support of the courts of justice of the 
Council of the Indies.71
However, while the antagonism between Grillo and Lomellino’s com-
pany and the Seville consulado reflects the tensions between two differ-
ent business models competing for the trade in goods other than slaves, 
the rivalry with the Lima consulado was a struggle for spheres of trade. 
Once the lawsuit surrounding the payment of the averías was solved in 
favour of the consulado, and since this seems to have brought the matter 
to a conclusion, the Lima consulado refrained from complaining to the 
Council of the Indies about the presence of asiento factors in the Isthmus 
of Panama. Yet, this changed again in April 1672. The arrival of factors 
Agostino Grillo and Tomás de Llanos at El Callao, along with a cargo of 
African slaves, with the intention of opening a permanent branch of the 
asiento in Lima set the alarm bells ringing for the consulado.72
The mobility of factors was not explicitly allowed by the asiento char-
ter, and constituted a grey area open to interpretation. The charter es-
tablished in what harbours the asiento factors were entitled to disembark 
and sell slaves, but no mention was made of the possibility of the factors 
driving the slaves further inland. As early as July 1663, Domenico Grillo 
had requested permission from the Council of the Indies for his factors 
not to be personally bound to the geographical limits of the charter and 
for the exemption from the alcabala to be of application beyond the 
official harbours, but the council’s prosecutors rejected this idea.73 How-
ever, the asiento factors found ways to circumvent limitations to trade 
beyond the limits of the charter without infringing them.
While Grillo and Lomellino’s factors sold most slaves on the Isthmus 
to Panama, Trujillo or Lima merchants, they used front men to sell Af-
rican captives in coastal Peru. This practice and the rationale behind it 
were not a secret to anyone. According to some Panamanian witnesses, 
until 1672 the asiento factors had operated in Peru directly from the 
Isthmus, using “Spanish [middlemen] in order not to be seen breaking 
the terms of their asiento.”74 The use of front men was common practice 
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in colonial trade, as it allowed many merchants to enter specific deals or 
markets that were in principle barred to them. However, the front men 
used by the asiento factors were not sheltered by the asiento privileges 
and therefore, they were subjected to the payment of taxes collected by 
the consulado in Lima.
The Lima consulado’s loud complaints to the Viceroy of Peru and the 
Council of the Indies about the presence of the asiento factors in Lima by 
1672 suggest that, with the removal of Grillo and Lomellino’s factors, the 
consulado did not aim to undermine the asiento slave trade monopoly, 
but simply to counter a free rider attempting to penetrate Pacific South 
America. As long as the asiento factors limited themselves to selling Afri-
can slaves on the Isthmus to the Panamanian and Peruvian retailers, that 
was a sound business for the consulado, which could benefit from taxing 
the latter upon their arrival to Lima. Under these terms, the consulado 
was interested in seeing the African slave trade to Pacific South America 
revived as much as possible. And the asiento organisation was the most 
capable means of doing so. Grillo and Lomellino proved their capacity 
to foster and channel the trans-imperial African slave trade from the Ca-
ribbean to the Isthmus of Panama, the gateway to Pacific South America. 
The presence of African slave traders on the Isthmus operating outside 
the asiento cannot be discarded, but they could hardly compete with the 
Genoese company in terms of trade volume and reliability. Additionally, 
since Buenos Aires attracted decreasing numbers of slave ships from the 
1660s onwards, the relative importance of Grillo and Lomellino in fos-
tering the flow of African captives into Pacific South America increased 
even more.75
The physical presence of Domenico Grillo’s factors in El Callao, Lima, 
and their insistence on operating under the umbrella of the asiento priv-
ileges, was a different thing altogether for the consulado. The Lima con-
sulado objected to the presence of Grillo and Lomellino’s factors in the 
city because they feared losing the chance to charge them the rights of 
alcabala there.76 But a more veiled reason can explain the consulado’s 
concerns too: the powerful Lima buyers would not hesitate to welcome 
the asiento factors in the city, as that would enhance the local markets 
for African slaves, whether they had paid taxes to consulado or not.
The Factors and the Local Slave Buyers
One of the consulados’ recurrent complaints about the asiento concerned 
the high price of African slaves in Spanish America. According to Count 
Lemos, Viceroy of Peru, African slaves in Lima fetched prices in excess 
of 1,000 pesos, and this for a simple reason: “because of the harmful 
effects of the monopoly.”77 It is true that the asiento charter gave Grillo 
and Lomellino the monopoly for the introduction of African slaves and 
total liberty to set their prices. Yet, how true were these reports? Were 
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they part of the smear campaign orchestrated by the consulados against 
Domenico Grillo? What was the attitude of Spanish American buyers 
towards Grillo and Lomellino’s factors?
While complaints about “defective” slaves are not difficult to come 
by in the records, the purchasers’ perceptions of the price they were 
paying is harder to find.78 However, comparing the prices fetched by 
slaves before and after the beginning of the asiento, can help us confirm 
whether, as the consulados claimed, Grillo’s monopoly had a significant 
impact on slave prices. Let us see an example from the Isthmus. Between 
mid-October and mid-November 1656, the Panamanian notary Alonso 
Sánchez de Figueroa recorded 25 transactions involving the sale of 28 
African captives. The average price of a healthy adult slave was 501 
pesos for males and 564.5 for females, while children went for an aver-
age price of 300 pesos.79 Eight years later, between January and March 
1664, Giustiniano Giustiniani in Portobelo was selling adult males for 
512 pesos, females for 460 and children for 353. Based on these exam-
ples, it seems that Grillo and Lomellino’s monopoly did not significantly 
affect the market price of slaves.
It is even possible that in other markets such as Lima, Grillo and Lo-
mellino’s monopoly had the opposite effect, bringing prices down, at 
least occasionally. For instance, on 3 February 1660, Roque de Ormae-
chea sold a 26-year-old slave called Antonio Carabalí, whom he had 
previously acquired in Panama, to the master tailor Salvador López 
del Valle for 850 pesos.80 Similarly, on 26 November 1661, Manuel 
Grande de los Cobos sold Diego Rico de Guinea a 20-year-old bozal 
slave called Juan Arara, whom he had brought from Panama, for 950 
pesos.81 However, ten years later in Lima, between June 1671 and 
July 1672, the asiento factor Agostino Grillo sold 59 enslaved male 
Africans between 20 and 26 years old for an average of 778 pesos 
each.82 The prices at which other sellers sold their slaves did not dif-
fer substantially from those asked by Agostino Grillo.83 There can be 
little doubt that the African slave trade to the Spanish Caribbean was 
reactivated during the 1650s. It was, however, still early in the days of 
this trade, costs for the merchants must have been high and the supply 
of African slaves limited in many Spanish American cities, like Lima. 
It seems plausible that the privileges and security provided by the 
asiento allowed Grillo and Lomellino to bring down transaction costs, 
while keeping the slave prices stable. Although market prices in Span-
ish America did not change significantly, the profit margin may have 
been greater for Grillo and Lomellino than for the slave merchants 
who conducted this business in the years prior to the establishment of 
the asiento, in a more volatile and riskier environment. In view of the 
larger, steadier supply of captives and certain price stability, perhaps 
the new asiento system was not bad news at all for those interested in 
acquiring African slaves.
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In relation to sales, Grillo and Lomellino’s factors exchanged African 
slaves for silver, and sometimes payment in kind, but the buyers also 
benefitted from purchasing captives on credit. The credit environment 
in which the factors operated in Spanish America was very different to 
the one that other chartered companies involved in the slave trade, such 
as the Royal Adventurers, faced in the English Caribbean at the time. 
Plantation owners in Jamaica and Barbados generally bought slaves on 
credit, paid late (when they paid) and with sugar.84 Their debts to the 
Royal Adventurers were inherited by the Royal African Company. Ac-
cording to Kenneth Davies, by 1676, Barbados plantation owners owed 
the company “as much as £ 70,000, the equivalent of two-thirds of its 
share-capital.”85 Grillo and Lomellino’s factors also sold slaves on credit 
from the start, but defaults from the buyers never became a major prob-
lem for the company or any of the factors.
The role of credit becomes clear from the first slave sales, for example, 
in Portobelo. The first asiento ship arrived to Portobelo in late January 
1664. The Santa Cruz had left Cadiz for Curaçao on 8 June 1663. Under 
the supervision of Giustiniano Giustiniani, the ship unloaded 572 slaves 
on the Isthmus of Panama, 450 of whom were delivered to the factor 
Marcelo García de las Cañas in Panama City. Giustiniani sold 91 slaves 
in Portobelo, raising 39,680 pesos. Nearly 21% of these slaves were sold 
on credit.86
Sales on credit illustrate the Panamanian everyday economic envi-
ronment in which the asiento factors manoeuvred. For instance, Juan 
Castillo, a Castilian-born official based in Portobelo committed to pay 
Giustiniani the price of two slaves after he was paid his wages by the 
Audiencia of Panama.87 Catalina Sánchez, Leonor María and Matías de 
Valdés promised to do so after the arrival of the galleons from Spain.88 
This example not only underscores how women played a key role in 
everyday transactions in the Isthmus of Panama.89 More broadly, it 
also shows that, although the trans-imperial slave trade and the intra- 
imperial trade in other goods operated within different institutional 
spheres – the asiento and the Carrera de Indias, respectively –, their 
financial and commercial flows were interconnected, even at the level of 
personal transactions.90
By selling on credit, the factors entered the trans-local credit networks 
of slave buyers. Factors accepted payment to be made in a different place 
to that where the slave had been purchased. For example, Matías Guerra 
de Lastra bought several slaves from Giuseppe Bustanzo in Cartagena 
de Indias, but sent a draft for the money to be made effective in Porto-
belo.91 It was also common for people who purchased slaves on credit 
in Portobelo and Panama City to pay later, sometimes months after-
wards, in places such as Lima.92 This sort of operation reveals the credit 
networks in which the local slave buyers were already immersed before 
the asiento. Moreover, it also shows how, by accepting the conditions 
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proposed by the buyers, the asiento factors gained a platform from which 
to build their own credit networks between the Caribbean and Pacific 
South America. Collecting debts in different places certainly pushed the 
asiento factors to extend their reach, but at the same time it gave them an 
opportunity to penetrate credit and relational networks that pivoted on 
trading geographies, ports and urban economies that were often beyond 
the asiento charter’s boundaries, like Trujillo or Lima.
Trade on Demand
The relevance of Spanish American buyers in shaping the asiento trade 
and the factors’ market opportunities on the ground was far from being 
negligible. Domenico Grillo, his partners in Amsterdam and his factors 
in the Caribbean were not the only ones to shape the array of goods to 
be sent to Spanish America. The inhabitants of Panama used the asiento 
factors to satisfy demands that the Carrera de Indias convoys could not 
address on time. To a large extent, rather than unilaterally deciding 
what commodities to put on offer, the factors accommodated to meet the 
demand posed by Spanish American buyers. Some of these goods had a 
prominent meaning for the everyday life of the inhabitants of a Spanish 
colonial city like Panama, and also for the very defence of the colonies. 
Let us consider two examples: wax and gunpowder.
The asiento ship San Vicente arrived to Portobelo from Curaçao in 
December 1671. It was loaded with a crate full of white wax candles 
and two crates of worked or purified beeswax. These 15 arrobas and 53 
pounds of wax (almost 197 kilos) had travelled alongside other goods 
and manufactured products and nearly 600 African slaves – 358 adult 
men, 118 adult women, 78 boys and 34 girls.93 How to interpret the ar-
rival of beeswax to the Isthmus of Panama? Wax was a luxury product 
that played a central place in Catholic piety, which was, in turn, one of 
the cornerstones providing cohesion to the dispersed territories of the 
Spanish Empire. Wax candles were used for lighting, but also had a fun-
damental role to play in Baroque ritual and liturgy, including masses, 
processions and funerals. The symbolic role of candles is sadly high-
lighted by their use by the factors in Panama in the burial of the African 
slaves who died during the voyage. Between 15 June and 21 September 
1665, Giustiniano Giustiniani covered the burial costs (120 pesos, in-
cluding the use of wax candles) of 18 men and 9 women described as 
bozales, who had died shortly after being disembarked in Portobelo.94 
Beeswax was not only highly in demand, but also a product for which 
few alternatives existed. Animal fat, for instance, could be used instead 
of beeswax for lighting, but the difference in quality between products 
could hardly be compared, especially because of the bad smell generated 
by animal fat. Wax also had medicinal uses.95
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According to the ship’s captain, Pedro de Armendáriz, the wax had 
been brought to Portobelo at the request of the mayordomo of the Broth-
erhood of the Holy Sacrament, Domingo de Gondra.96 This brother-
hood had a chapel and an altar in Panama Cathedral, and was one of 
the oldest lay religious associations in the Isthmus. It was also one of the 
most elitist and, alongside the brotherhoods of Our Lady of the Holy 
Souls and of Saint Joseph, also attached to the cathedral, was one of the 
main religious associations “for Spaniards.” In total, 26 brotherhoods 
competed to get their hands on the wax they used in their liturgy.97 
Gondra was responsible for the supply of the necessary wax for the 
“adornment” of the brotherhood. Beeswax being a scarce resource, in 
June 1671 Gondra wrote a letter to Pedro de Armendáriz and the factor 
Francesco Maria Compiano, which he hoped were at Curaçao. Gondra 
sent the letter via the asiento ship Santa Cruz.98
Beeswax was a frequent commodity for the asiento factors, and the 
demand for this product went beyond Panama City. The arrival of wax 
from Curaçao to the Spanish American ports in asiento ships continued 
while the charter was in force. In February 1674, the captain Francisco 
de Hoyos arrived in Cartagena de Indias from Curaçao with the ship San 
Fortunato. In addition to 344 African slaves and other commodities, 
the ship was loaded with “worked white beeswax.”99 Gondra and other 
buyers in Cartagena de Indias used the factors to access this African 
product to feed “our Holy Faith.” Ironically, beeswax was commercial-
ised in the Caribbean by Protestant and Sephardic middlemen.100
In a similar way, the asiento factors also brought “heretic” gunpow-
der from Curaçao following the request of the governor of Panama. 
Gunpowder was key for the defence of the population and to keep the 
territorial cohesion of the Spanish Empire, and few would split hairs 
over its provenance. The only real concerns were price and quality. For 
instance, in 1669 the Governor of Panama, don Juan Pérez de Guzmán 
bought 1,300 pounds of Dutch gunpowder conveyed from Curaçao in 
an asiento ship. The amount of gunpowder involved makes it implausi-
ble that this was an operation on-the-hoof. It is much more reasonable 
to suppose that the governor commissioned the asiento factors to buy 
the gunpowder in Curaçao on his behalf. Such a large amount of a stra-
tegic product like gunpowder could hardly go unnoticed. It is perhaps 
for this reason that Pérez de Guzmán tried to justify his actions to the 
Queen, arguing that not only was the Dutch gunpowder supplied by the 
asiento factors cheaper than that produced in Peru (5 reales per pound 
instead of 8), but also better.101 As with wax, factors regularly traded in 
gunpowder on demand. During the early 1670s, the governors of Pan-
ama still relied for its defence on the gunpowder brought by the factors 
from Curaçao, who sold it for even lower prices than before at 2.5 reales 
per pound.102
222 Implementing the Asiento and Smuggling
Cooperation with Local Traders
The Seville and Lima consulados had stood as the voice of Spanish 
American merchants against Grillo and Lomellino, but in fact they only 
represented some among them. The asiento trade channelled profits from 
the colonial setting into the metropolis, but many merchants from the 
colony also benefitted from this trade. Trade in slaves and contraband in 
Spanish America was only possible because of the cooperation of local 
merchants, authorities and royal officials. Who were these people on the 
Isthmus of Panama? How did they contribute to the operation of the 
asiento trade?
In the case of the Isthmus, the locals offered Grillo and Lomellino’s 
agents crucial logistical support.103 Any merchant who wished to send 
goods from the Caribbean to Peru, and vice versa, was compelled to 
cooperate with those in control of the transisthmian roads – mule driv-
ers, royal officials, civil servants, and military officers – leading to high 
transaction costs. Any commercial venture that tried to bypass the lo-
cals would find itself in severe jeopardy. Tax farmers operating on the 
Isthmus, like the Lima consulado, were equally dependent on the locals’ 
willingness to facilitate the enforcement of tax collection. As such, the 
Lima consulado was permanently in contact with the Panamanian au-
thorities aiming for their cooperation to lessen systematic tax-evasion 
practices.104 Although this fraud against the Crown’s revenue and the 
tax farmers could only take place with the complicity of royal officials, 
and military and governmental authorities, this complicity was not free. 
In the mid-17th century, merchants were bribing local authorities in Por-
tobelo, Boquerón and Panama City with 2% of the total value of their 
silver cargoes to avoid the payment of taxes.105 Other players, like the 
Panamanian mule drivers also made life difficult for the Lima merchants 
by repeatedly increasing the price of their services, which eventually be-
came the most expensive form of transport in Spanish America.106 Far 
from being an exception, the asiento trade was largely dependent on 
the cooperation of the local actors. In February 1668, Domenico Grillo 
reported to his partners in Genoa that, in the previous year, he spent 
35,000 pesos for the services of his factors and the collaboration of the 
Panamanians (often in the form of bribes) to organise the delivery of 539 
slaves from Curaçao.107
Many of those local actors to which Domenico Grillo referred in his 
letter concentrated in the fortresses around Portobelo and the Chagres 
River, where they acted as the veritable gatekeepers of the transisthmian 
routes. When Grillo and Lomellino’s factors arrived to Portobelo, the key 
player on the Caribbean coast of the Isthmus was Jorge Calvo Minucho, 
who had been appointed maestre de campo at Portobelo shortly be-
fore, putting him in command of the military forces and the fortress.108 
But Calvo Minucho was no novice. His uncle Pedro Pablo, who was of 
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Genoese origin, had been a central personality in the political and eco-
nomic life of Panama during the first half of the century.109 By the late 
1640s, Calvo Minucho was one of the leaders of the local community 
of Portobelo, where he was appointed mayor, and also possessed several 
barges and launches to bring in goods and slaves to the Isthmus.110 In 
the 1650s Calvo Minucho began receiving military appointments in the 
fortresses of Portobelo. The fact that all three presidents of the Audien-
cia during the 1650s appointed him suggests that his local connections 
were strong, and probably made him irreplaceable. By means of his post 
at the garrison, Calvo Minucho facilitated several operations to smuggle 
clothing, and also thwarted a few others, making a profit either way. For 
example, in 1657, Calvo Minucho bought the Dutch ship León Negro 
at a bargain price in an auction, having helped seize it when it tried to 
smuggle 56 slaves into Portobelo.111
Cooperation between Grillo and Lomellino’s agents and Calvo Mi-
nucho began as soon as the first asiento ship docked at Portobelo in 
January 1664, if not earlier. The unloaded slaves were housed in several 
houses and barracks owned by Calvo Minucho, for 700 pesos.112 Nat-
urally, Calvo Minucho used this opportunity to augment his own pool 
of slaves, and bought six boys, a woman and her daughter.113 Over the 
years, the asiento factors continued using Calvo Minucho’s houses and 
warehouses to store the contraband goods being smuggled in and out 
of the Isthmus of Panama.114 The relationship between Calvo Minucho 
and the factors was common knowledge, and the former did not hesitate 
to testify in their favour in several lawsuits.115 The fact that the factors 
in Panama delegated a good deal of their powers to actors such as Calvo 
Minucho is revealing of the symbiotic relationship that the asiento main-
tained with some local power groups.116
Characters like Calvo Minucho allowed Giustiniano Giustiniani, 
Agostino Grillo, and Marcelo García de las Cañas to mobilise a host of 
local actors that helped to channel the slaves and contraband through 
Portobelo, Panama City, and down the Pacific route towards Lima.117 
For instance, with the arrival of the asiento ship San Vicente in Decem-
ber 1670, a Jorge Pezero acted on behalf of the factors as “pawn and cus-
todian” of 220 slaves in Portobelo. These slaves were led inland to the 
Venta de Chagres by a Spanish-born man called Antonio Pérez and one 
Luis Salazar. Pérez and Salazar had several assistants, including Mateo 
Benítez, a free mulatto. Once at the Venta de Chagres, the slaves were 
entrusted to one Pedro Díaz de Ibarra, who led them to Panama City, 
where an asiento factor received the human cargo.118
From Madrid, Domenico Grillo had carefully controlled the appoint-
ment of jueces conservadores in the Indies, a key piece in overseeing 
the privileges of the asiento. But the factors on the ground also had an 
important role to play in this regard by making sure that the office was 
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in the right hands. Grillo and Lomellino’s factors put pressure on Ro-
drigo del Corro Carrascal, Bernardo Trigo Figueroa, and Pedro Casela 
to delegate their powers as jueces conservadores to Pedro Ladrón de 
Guevara, a member of Calvo Minucho’s social circle.119 From as early 
as 1651, Ladrón de Guevara had been in command of the fortresses on 
the Chagres River and in Portobelo and, unsurprisingly, he was also in-
volved in smuggling alongside Calvo Minucho.120 As juez conservador 
in Portobelo, Ladrón de Guevara was personally in charge of inspecting 
the asiento ships on their arrival and departure, and did his best to avoid 
the intromission of royal officials.121
The knowledge of local Panamanians was fully exploited by Grillo 
and Lomellino’s factors in those fields in which they were less expe-
rienced, like the practicalities of slavery. Again, Portobelo’s fortresses 
proved to be a crucial source of know-how, as illustrated by the case of 
Antonio de Lara. Like Jorge Calvo Minucho and Pedro Ladrón de Gue-
vara, Antonio de Lara was a soldier whose duties involved controlling 
the transisthmian roads.122 He had also taken a keen interest in the busi-
ness of slavery. In June 1659, he bid successfully for a group of African 
slaves confiscated from a smuggler; he paid 275 pesos for 35 slaves who 
were in a bad way physically, hoping to restore them to health before re-
selling them.123 Giustiniano Giustiniani described Antonio de Lara as a 
“capable and discerning person” in dealing with the African captives.124 
Unsurprisingly, de Lara’s knowledge afforded him a position within the 
local framework of the asiento by evaluating the physical condition of 
the slaves brought to Portobelo.125
Antonio de Lara’s experience of slavery was far more complex and 
heterogeneous than Grillo and Lomellino’s factors. While Grillo and Lo-
mellino’s company only traded in Bozal slaves, characters like Antonio 
de Lara were traffickers tout court. Antonio de Lara relied on the asiento 
factors to acquire African slaves recently brought to the isthmus, who 
had barely undergone any cultural assimilation. On 16, 17, 21, 22, and 
28 May 1664, for example, de Lara bought from the asiento factors as 
many as 36 women and 17 men for 30,325 pesos.126 When needed, de 
Lara turned to channels different from the asiento to find captives with 
other characteristics. Around 1669, he bought a mulatto slave called 
Catalina Mayoco, aged 20, in Portobelo, afterwards sending her to 
Lima to be sold. A 22-year-old Panama-born zambo slave – of African 
and American indigenous descent – named Leonardo met an identical 
fate.127 Most probably, de Lara’s interest in trading in captives of differ-
ent backgrounds and origins was based on his up-to-date knowledge of 
Lima buyers’ specific demands.
Indeed, many more of the African slaves brought by Grillo and Lomel-
lino’s factors from Jamaica and Curaçao to the Isthmus of Panama were 
forced to follow Catalina Mayoco and Leonardo to Lima. Apparently, 
Antonio de Lara’s main business was to bring slaves to Pacific South 
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America, where he possessed a large and close commercial network 
based on kin and credit relations. In October 1669, for instance, Anto-
nio de Lara purchased 300 slaves from Grillo and Lomellino’s agents in 
Portobelo. The payment was made in hard cash after Antonio acquired 
a debt of 134,000 pesos from don Francisco Espinosa de los Monteros, 
a Lima trader affiliated with the city’s consulado, who travelled to the 
Isthmus to acquire merchandise.128 On 6 September 1670, Antonio’s 
brother, Juan, honoured 79,125 pesos of the debt in Lima, where he was 
marketing the slaves and where the creditor resided.129 That instalment 
was probably partially paid from the 16,078 pesos that Juan de Lara 
had obtained from the sale of 21 African slaves in Lima the previous 
month. While Lima buyers paid Juan de Lara an average of 765.6 pesos 
per slave, his brother Antonio had spent 446.6 pesos for each of them 
in Portobelo.130 For the de Lara brothers, the business of slavery was a 
profitable full-time job. While Juan de Lara was selling those slaves in 
Lima, Antonio was in Trujillo, northern Peru, personally selling another 
group of 235 African slaves bought in the Isthmus of Panama.131
When in early 1671 Agostino Grillo and Tomás de Llanos went to 
Lima to open an asiento branch there, they used the combined support 
of the agent network designed by Domenico Grillo from Madrid and the 
network built on the ground around Portobelo’s fortresses, which to a 
large extent revolved around the de Lara brothers. In 1664, Domenico 
Grillo’s appointed Sebastián de la Cueva as the asiento’s main agent in 
Lima.132 Patronage ties bounded de la Cueva to Domenico Grillo, as 
the latter had brokered de la Cueva’s appointment in Lima as treasurer 
of the bienes de difuntos office that same year.133 In this capacity, de la 
Cueva often had to transfer money from Lima to Seville, which put him 
in an ideal position to collect debts on behalf of Grillo and Lomellino’s 
company, for instance those incurred by local buyers when acquiring 
slaves from the asiento factors on the Isthmus of Panama.134 In addition, 
because of his official position, de la Cueva was well acquainted with the 
machinery of government and justice in Lima, something which soon 
proved to be of great value for Domenico Grillo’s factors.
Sebastián de la Cueva advised Agostino Grillo to choose Alonso de 
Arcos Valencia as their attorney in their litigation against the Lima con-
sulado, a matter of utmost importance. Juan de Lara backed this choice, 
featuring as a witness in the notarial record of the appointment.135 The 
de Lara brothers’ entourage of urban slave dealers in Lima supported 
the opening of the asiento’s branch in the city. Some of these individuals 
were swiftly co-opted by Agostino Grillo, who delegated some of his 
authority to them. The example posed by Simón de Orcasitas is para-
digmatic of these networks’ entanglement with the asiento trade. While 
in 1670, Simón de Orcasitas marketed African slaves on behalf of Juan 
de Lara, by 1671 he was selling captives as a representative of Agostino 
Grillo.136
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Domenico Grillo’s factors employed a wide set of strategies to secure 
the cooperation of these local networks and benefit from their exper-
tise. In addition to incorporating local agents into the asiento businesses, 
sharing profits, or paying them directly for their services, the asiento 
factors also offered locals the chance to benefit from the patronage of 
Domenico Grillo in Madrid. At the end of the day, Domenico Grillo 
was one of the Crown’s major bankers and an important personality in 
Madrid, where he was in a position to secure favours for his new friends 
in Spanish America, as he already did with Sebastián de la Cueva back in 
1664. Antonio de Oliveros, the asiento factors’ main clerk in Lima, soon 
enjoyed the manifold benefits of engaging with his new Genoese friends. 
Before returning to Panama Agostino Grillo gave Oliveros the job of 
supervising the new agents he had appointed in Lima, like Simón de 
Orcasitas, until the arrival of the new asiento factor, Esteban de Guillén 
Aroche. One way in which Agostino Grillo earned Oliveros’ loyalty was 
by promising Domenico Grillo’s help to buy a post as escribano super-
numerario for him for 3,000 pesos. It seems that this strategy paid off, 
and years later Oliveros was given a position as public clerk of the coun-
cil, royal mines and royal finances in the province of Huarachorí (near 
Lima) and the mines of Nuevo Potosí.137
Conclusions
From a commercial perspective, the implementation of Grillo’s asiento 
meant two different things. First, the creation of an official corridor cou-
pling the trans-imperial and intra-Spanish American trades. Second, the 
establishment of a monopolistic system to be exploited by private com-
panies which set the basis for the African slave trade to and in Spanish 
America until the 1730s. The experience of Domenico Grillo’s factors 
in Spanish America, the way they had to navigate local conditions, was 
unique insofar as they had to craft the new competition and cooperation 
dynamics that were to prevail over the following decades.
The conflicts that resulted from the implementation of Grillo and Lo-
mellino’s asiento on the ground were to reappear every time a new slave 
asiento was granted. Something similar occurred when companies over-
stepped their charters to meddle with the privileges of other actors. The 
attempts of English South Sea Company factors to evade the payment of 
alcabalas to local tax-farmers or to trade beyond their factories repro-
duced the events that followed the arrival of Domenico Grillo’s factors 
to the Isthmus of Panama and their expansion from Panama City to 
Lima, 40 years earlier. The contraband activities of the South Sea Com-
pany cannot be attributed to the ingenuity of its agents, as has often 
been done, or to the inexperience of royal officials, or to the negligence 
of Crown ministers.138 It appears that using the asiento charter to con-
duct contraband operations was the default option for any merchant 
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operating within a given legal framework that compelled him to deal in 
a specific form of merchandise, like African slaves, in a particular geog-
raphy. In the first half of the 18th century, these practices were part and 
parcel of Spanish America’s everyday life, and the modus operandi of 
Grillo and Lomellino had contributed a great deal to make it so.
Portobelo’s importance in Grillo and Lomellino’s strategies extended 
to future monopolistic asiento companies, and it became the main Span-
ish American entry point for African slaves from the 1660s to the 1730s. 
Portobelo’s rise as a centre of the trans-imperial intra-American slave 
trade undermined the mercantile primacy that Cartagena de Indias had 
enjoyed until about 1640. While Portuguese merchants who relied on 
transatlantic slave voyages spurred the rise of Cartagena de Indias as the 
leading wholesale market for African slaves in the Spanish Caribbean, 
the Genoese Grillo and Lomellino and other international companies 
operating monopolistic asientos and intra-American shipping favoured 
the Isthmus of Panama. The Isthmus of Panama’s strategic location, 
which allowed it to act as a gateway for Peruvian markets, made Porto-
belo an attractive destination for the monopolistic asiento companies. 
However, all this was only possible because of the cooperation of certain 
local groups.
Domenico Grillo’s delegation of power and functions on the factors 
played an essential role in extending the reach of the asiento networks 
and incorporating local agents. The Spanish American side of the net-
work could only be created in situ through everyday interactions. Asiento 
factors shared the profits of their trade with local agents to reward their 
cooperation or buy their acquiescence. From the fortresses of Portobelo, 
actors such as Jorge Calvo Minucho and Antonio de Lara made their co-
lonial knowledge, their local power, and their networks available for the 
asiento factors to bring their African slaves and their contraband goods 
across the Isthmus of Panama and into Pacific South America. They also 
mediated to help the asiento factors to penetrate regional markets else-
where, for instance, with the export of Peruvian cocoa to the Caribbean.
The benefits that local actors derived from their cooperation with Do-
menico Grillo’s factors were not only economic. It also allowed them to 
advance socially, perpetuate their local power, and increase their pro-
fessional networks both geographically and over time. In the Isthmus 
of Panama, Domingo Gondra did much more than ordering wax from 
Grillo and Lomellino’s factors in Curaçao. The rapport ran much deeper 
than that, and earned him a privileged position in the relational world of 
the trans-imperial asiento trade. Ultimately, Gondra’s familiarity with the 
inner workings of the asiento trade allowed him to become a factor for 
future asiento companies, such as the Seville consulado or the Dutchman 
Balthasar Coymans.139 Something similar happened with Juan de Ori-
amuño, one of Grillo’s factors’ supplier of Peruvian cocoa on the Isthmus 
of Panama. While becoming one of the main businessmen on the isthmus 
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in the 1670s and 1680s – he had investments in pearl hunting, gold min-
ing, and shipping – Oriamuño also worked on behalf of Balthasar Coy-
mans.140 The asiento trade gave local producers and merchants a secure 
avenue to channel their goods towards the trans-imperial markets.
American buyers benefitted greatly from the asiento trade, at least on 
the Isthmus of Panama and Peru. The benefits in Panama were obvi-
ous. There, local demand determined the products that Grillo’s factors 
brought from Curaçao. This was favoured by the regular traffic of slave 
ships within Caribbean trade routes. Regarding the African slave trade, 
compared with the 1650s, it does not seem that the creation of Domen-
ico Grillo’s monopolistic asiento increased the price of slaves in Panama 
and Lima. What seems obvious is that the number of coerced African 
migrants who were moved through the Isthmus of Panama into in Pacific 
South America increased.
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